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I. INTRODUCTION
James Madison once said, "some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper
use of everything; and in no instance is this more true than in that of the press."I The
law of defamation and this Note concern themselves with some of these abuses. 2 The
law of defamation serves to protect a person's reputation from publicized falsehoods
which harm that reputation. 3 Some form of defamation law has existed in the
common law since early English canon law, prior to the Norman conquest. 4 For over
a thousand years, the common law has continued to protect a person's good name
from false statements. 5
In 1964, the United States Supreme Court, in New York Times v. Sullivan,6 first
found that the interests of the first amendment conflicted with and limited state
defamation law.7 According to the Court's findings, juries too often were punishing
defendants for the unpopularity of the content of the views expressed, rather than the
damage caused by a false and defamatory statement. 8 The Court also found that
legitimate speech would be "chilled" for fear that a small factual error could lead to
a large damage award for a plaintiff.9 During the twenty-one years following New
York Times, the state courts have attempted to weigh the public interest of free and
unfettered speech against the state's interest in protecting its citizens' reputations
from defamatory attacks. In striking a balance between these competing interests, the
courts have considered a number of factors, such as the status of the plaintiff (public
official or public/private figure), the status of the defendant (media/nonmedia), and
the subject matter of the statement (public/private issue). The standard of liability and
the type of damages allowed will vary, depending on a court's determination of these
1. 4 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDEA. CoNssrnumoN 571 (1876).
2. See generally, e.g., W. Bmto.N, PINCIPLES OF mE LAw OF LIBEL AND St.NDE (1935); L. ELDREDGE, THE LAw Or
DEFAATIo. (1978); H. Fouirt, THE LAw OF SLANDER AND LIBEL (3d ed. 1869); H. FRsE, FRsER oN LIBEL (6th ed. 1925);
C. GAmTEY, GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SANDER (1924); M. NETa.L, NrEsu. oN SLANDER AND LIBEL (1890); W. OooERS, LIBEL AND
S.N'DR (1881); R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLE ,S (1980); Anderson, Libel and Press Censorship, 53 TEX.
L. REv. 422 (1975); Christie, Underlying Contradictions in the Supreme Court's Classification of Defamation, 1981 DUE
L.J. 811; Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical
Primer, 61 VA. L. REv. 1349 (1975); Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUm. L REv. 1205
(1976); Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 TEN. L. REv. 1221 (1976); Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and
the Law of Libel: The Modern Revised Translation, 49 CoRNELL L. Rv. 581 (1964).
3. L. ELDRE GE, supra note 2, at 2.
4. Lovell, The "Reception" of Defamation by the Common Law, 15 VAN,. L. REv. 1051, 1052 (1962).
5. L. ELDREDGE, supra note 2, at 6.
6. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
7. Id. at 264.
8. See id. at 294 (Black, J., concurring).
9. See id. at 278-79 (majority opinion).
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factors. The most recent of these decisions came in Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc. 10
The end result of this series of decisions is a constitutional defamation standard
which, through its confusing application and misguided emphases, does not protect
a person's reputational interest or the interests of the first amendment. This Note will
examine the precepts of defamation law; the development of the constitutional
restrictions, emphasizing the recent decision in Greenmoss; and some proffered
solutions by scholars in the area. It will then offer a solution of its own.
II. THE COMMON LAW OF DEFAMATION
Traditionally, the main purpose of defamation law has been to publicly vindicate
the plaintiff's name. I I In very early defamation law, the only remedy available for a
defamation claim was a public apology by the defendant and possibly some punitive
action.12 After the Norman Conquest, the defamation claim fell within the jurisdic-
tion of the church courts, and the only remedy was public vindication. 13 Limited
monetary damages became an available remedy only in the latter half of the sixteenth
century, when the common law courts obtained jurisdiction.14
Monetary damages serve a second purpose of defamation law; compensating the
plaintiff for the harm which has occurred. ' 5 A third purpose of defamation law has been
one of deterrence, to punish the defendant who has acted outrageously and dissuade
that defendant and others from publishing false and defamatory statements. '
6
As the common law developed, damages were more easily granted to the plaintiff
as a remedy. Under the modem common law, defamation was a strict liability offense;
the publisher published at his or her peril. ' 7 All a plaintiff needed to prove was that
the defendant made a nonprivileged, defamatory statement about the plaintiff to a third
person. 18 Truth was an affirmative defense that could be raised by the defendant. 19
For certain types of defamation, such as those types of slander which did not fall
into a per se category,20 the plaintiff also needed to prove actual pecuniary harm,
known as special damages. 21 Otherwise, harm was presumed, and thejury could award
10. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
11. L. EtDREDG, supra note 2, at 4; RESTATEMEr (SEcoND) or ToRTS § 623 Special Note (1977).
12. See Lovell, supra note 4, at 1052. A typical penalty was the cutting off of the publisher's tongue. Id.
13. Id. at 1055. Public vindication took the form of the publisher, wrapped in a white shroud, holding a lighted
candle, and kneeling, confessing the sin in the presence of priests and the injured party. Id.
14. L. ELDRDGE, supra note 2, at 5.
15. Id.; RFsrATAFmENT (S coND) OF TORTS § 623 Special Note (1977).
16. L. EL.REE, supra note 2, at 6; RE~STrATEME (Futsr) or Toms § 908 comment a (1938).
17. Rex v. Woodfall, Lofft 776, 781, 98 Eng. Rep. 914, 916 (1774); L. EtDRn.E, supra note 2, at 15. See
REsrATsiENr (FRsT) OF ToRts 88 558, 563, 564, 579, 580 (1938).
18. RSATEmEn. (FRst) OF ToRrs § 558 (1938).
19. L. EL.REGo, supra note 2, at 323.
20. The four accepted per se categories are as follows: (1) Words which impute a criminal offense which is
punishable by death or imprisonment or is regarded by public opinion as involving moral turpitude; RSTATE.MENT (Ssco.%o)
OF ToRTs § 571 (1977); (2) Words which impute to the plaintiff a venereal disease; id. at § 572; (3) Words which impute
improper conduct in business; id. at § 573; and (4) Words which impute serious sexual misconduct; id. at § 574.
21. See RESTATrEMET (SEcoNo) OF TORTS 88 570, 575 (1977); L. ELDREDoE, supra note 2, at 94.
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damages without the plaintiff proving any harm.22 In the courts' view, injury to
reputation was too subtle and invidious to be subject to actual proof.23 Harm could take
several forms. Defamatory statements could result in avoidance of the plaintiff by
persons whom he or she does not know, as well as affecting the plaintiff's relationships
with people he or she does know, caused by the hidden doubts they may subconsciously
harbor. 24 Testimonial proof does not lend itself to discovering these harms, although
harms of these types can be inferred from knowledge of the general patterns of human
behavior.
The common law recognized that allowing recovery for defamation would have
a "chilling effect" on certain types of legitimate speech. To deal with this problem,
the common law developed an elaborate set of privileges. Some statements were
absolutely privileged, 25 such as those made during government proceedings and those
made by a public official while acting within the scope of official duties. The purpose
of a government proceeding would have been defeated if participants feared a
defamation claim resulting from statements made within the hearing.
Other more narrow, special privileges were available, 26 such as the right to
report on statements made in a government proceeding. These privileges were not
absolute, but only applied to accurate reports, made without malice.27 The courts had
determined that the public interest in receiving these statements was important even
if the publisher knew that statements made within the hearing were false. 28
A group of specified, conditional privileges also existed.2 9 For example, a
property owner would be protected for accusing someone of stealing personal
property. These privileges were "based upon a public policy that recognizes that it
is essential that true information be given whenever it is reasonably necessary for the
protection of one's own interests, the interests of third persons, or certain interests of
the public.' 30 These privileges were narrow and were not valid when abused, such
as when the publication was knowingly false, when unprivileged information was
included in a publication, or when information was published to persons beyond the
scope of the privilege. 3 '
22. Thorley v. Lord Kerry, 4 Taun. 355, 128 Eng. Rep. 367 (1812); RESTAT'M tEr (FrSt) OF ToRTs § 569 (1938).
23. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 394 (1974) (white, J., dissenting); W. PossEs, LAw OF Tos 765
(4th ed. 1971).
24. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 765.
25. R'A'TB.mNT (SEcoND) OF ToRmS §§ 583-92A.
26. Id. at §§ 611-12.
27. Id.; see also, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 458-59 (1976); American Dist. Tel. Co. v. Brink's,
Inc., 380 F.2d 131, 133 (7th Cir. 1967); Lulay v. Peoria Journal-Star, Inc., 34 111. 2d 112, 115, 214 N.E.2d 746, 748
(1966).
28. E.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 38 (1971); Barrows v. Bell, 73 Mass. (7 Gray) 301, 313
(1856); see also Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (inaccurate report held not to be privileged).
29. R'sTATmENr (SEcoND) OF Tora §§ 593-98A (1977).
30. Id. at 593 (scope note preceding) (1977).
31. Id. at §§ 599, 600, 602-605A.
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
A. New York Times v. Sullivan: The Constitutional Beginning
Prior to New York Times v. Sullivan,32 defamatory statements had been found to
be completely outside of first amendment protection. 33 The Court in New York Times
held that the first amendment limited the state's power to formulate its own
defamation law.34 The New York Times case concerned an advertisement which set
forth certain facts about a series of civil rights demonstrations in Alabama.35 A city
commissioner from Montgomery, Alabama brought a libel claim in the Alabama
courts alleging that certain facts in the advertisement were false and defamatory to the
plaintiff and his police force. 36 The jury found for the plaintiff and awarded $500,000
in damages. 37 The Alabama appellate courts sustained the verdict and the damage
award. 38 The United States Supreme Court then heard the case and constitutional
defamation law was born.
The New York Times case raised many of the first amendment concerns present
in the defamation area. The case presented to the Court a situation in which libel law
was being used to punish unpopular views and to attempt to "chill" speech in the
area. 39 Hostility to northern media coming to the south and "stirring up trouble" was
common during the time of the civil rights protests. 40
The Court held that, when a public official brings a defamation action, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with actual malice. 4' It defined actual
malice as knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. 42 The Court
reasoned that while false facts have no first amendment value per se, the first
amendment requires that the press have some "breathing space" while determining
truth or falsity of a statement. 43 If the press could be held liable for an accidental
32. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
33. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482-83 (1957) ("Libelous utterances are not within the area
of constitutionally protected speech."); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (libelous speech
among the "limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem"); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 714 (1931) ("Common law rules that subject the libeler to
responsibility for the public offense, ...are not abolished by the protection extended in our constitutions.").
34. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
35. Id. at 257-58. The advertisement contained the headline "Heed Their Rising Voices." It sought support for
the civil rights movement and Martin Luther King, Jr. in particular. Id. The advertisement, accusing no one by name,
stated that "Southern violaters" had arrested Dr. King seven times, had persecuted black students for singing "My
Country 'Tis of Thee" on the steps of the Alabama State Capitol, and had locked them out of their dining hall "'in an
attempt to starve them into submission.' "Id. The advertisement contained the names of twenty well-known people, who
were listed as supporters of their movement, and the names of a number of black clergymen. Id.
36. Id. at 258-59. Sullivan was a councilman in Montgomery who was in charge of the police department. Id. He
alleged that certain statements made in the advertisement were untrue and defamatory. Id. The "false and defamatory
facts" were: (1) that Dr. King had been arrested seven times (actually only four); (2) that the song was "My Country 'Tis
of Thee" (actually it was "The Star-Spangled Banner"); and (3) that the students were not locked out of the dining hall.
Id.
37. Id. at 254.
38. Id. at 263.
39. Id. at 294 (Black, J., concurring).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 279-80 (majority opinion).
42. Id. at 280.
43. See id. at 271-72.
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mistake of fact, the Court argued, it would be reluctant to pursue investigation into
any controversial area for fear that a mistake in fact could bring on a lawsuit. 44 The
Court found that such self-censorship is not consistent with the policies behind the
freedom of the press. 45
In the Court's opinion, "breathing space" is particularly necessary when the
alleged defamatory statement concerns a public official. 46 To be able to criticize
government officials freely, without fear of prosecution, is a basic precept of the first
amendment and self-government in general. 47 To make the press liable for accidental,
even negligent, mistakes in its criticism of public officials, the Court reasoned, is
analogous to the common law crime of seditious libel. 48
The Court also determined that, because public officials are immune from suit
upon any defamatory comments they might make in the scope of their duties, it would
not be equitable to allow them to bring such suits, at least not for accidental
mistakes. 49 Under this standard, legitimate speech presumably would not be chilled
since only speech known to be false or speech whose truth or falsity is determined
recklessly would be actionable.
B. Extension of the New York Times Framework
In 1967, the Court heard the next important constitutional defamation case,
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts.50 In this case the Court extended the New York Times
protection of the press to "public figures" as well as public officials. 51 Although
public figures do not have the immunity that public officials have, many of the first
amendment policies apply equally as well. The Court held that some people are
influential and deserving of unimpeded public comment, though they are not
currently elected to any public office. 52
In the next important case, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,53 a person,
arrested for selling allegedly obscene materials, brought suit against a local radio
station for failing to mention that the materials confiscated by the police were only
allegedly obscene. 54 The plurality opinion of three justices, written by Justice
Brennan, held that a plaintiff must show actual malice if the communication
concerned "matters of public or general concern. 55 Under the Rosenbloom test, the
status of the plaintiff was irrelevant; it was the public or private nature of the speech
that determined whether the heightened New York Times liability requirements would
apply. The plurality concluded that the first amendment was meant to protect speech
44. Id. at 279.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 270-79.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 273.
49. Id. at 282.
50. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
51. Id. at 163-65 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (controlling opinion).
52. Id.
53. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
54. Id. at 32-34 (plurality opinion).
55. Id. at 43-44.
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concerning public matters, so those first amendment interests prohibited the "chilling
effect" of a defamation claim unless actual malice could be shown.
56
Even though only three of the justices had supported the test, several lower
courts used the Rosenbloom public/private issue distinction of the plurality.
57
C. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,58
rejected the Rosenbloom plurality's public/private issue distinction and allowed the
state to determine its own standard of liability for defamation with certain limitations.
The Court held that the proper purpose of establishing a constitutional libel standard
was to balance the problem of media self-censorship with the societal value of
protecting the reputation of persons from defamatory falsehoods. 59 The majority
found the test proposed by the Rosenbloom plurality too difficult to apply, and dealt
only with the problem of self-censorship without considering the state's interest in
preventing defamatory falsehoods. 60
The Court concluded that when private individuals are plaintiffs, the state's
interest in protecting reputation outweighs the first amendment interest in preventing
self-censorship. 6' Certain characteristics of public figures not present with private
individuals shift the balance to require heightened press protection when a public
figure is the plaintiff.62 Public figures generally have far greater access to the media
than private individuals and are thus able to use self-help to combat the reputational
damages caused by the defamatory attack. 63 The Court realized that although
self-help is not enough in itself to undo the harm caused by the defamatory falsehood,
it is still a factor to be weighed in assessing the overall damage to the individual. 64
A public figure, by thrusting him or herself into the forefront of public controversies,
has assumed the risk of possible defamation. 65 Defamatory attacks, Justice Powell's
opinion stated, are part of the price one pays for living in the public eye.
66
While the Court held that the first amendment does not require a private figure
to establish actual malice, it nonetheless placed some restrictions on the state's power
to establish its own defamation law. When the plaintiff is a private figure, the Court
56. Id. at 40-44.
57. E.g., Firestone v. Time, Inc., 460 F.2d 712, 717 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 875 (1972); Treutler
v. Meredith Corp., 455 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1972); Gospel Spreading Church v. Johnson Publishing Co., 454 F.2d
1050, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Cerrito v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 306, 307 (9th Cir. 1971).
58. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
59. Id. at 343.
60. Id. at 339-46.
61. Id. at 344-46.
62. Id.
63. Id. But see Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 489 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (plaintiff not a public
figure despite several press conferences she had held during her divorce trial).
64. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 n.9 (1974).
65. Id. at 344-45.
66. Id.
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held, the state cannot follow the traditional common law rule of strict liability. 67 A
finding of at least negligence is required under the first amendment. 68
The majority opinion also forbade the imposition of presumed and punitive
damages unless a showing of actual malice is made. 69 The Court found that because
the state's interest in protecting the individual from defamatory falsehoods is
competing with a first amendment interest, the remedies the state can employ can
reach no further than is necessary to protect that legitimate state interest. 70 If
presumed damages are allowed, the jury would have too much discretion to award
damages beyond the actual harm suffered. 71 The Court, therefore, limited damages to
"actual harm." 72 "Actual harm" is not limited to common law "special damages,"
but includes "impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal
humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering" as long as competent evidence has
been presented showing that these types of harm actually have occurred. 73
Justice Powell's opinion also reasoned that "punitive damages are wholly
irrelevant to the state interest that justifies a negligence standard for defamation
actions.' 74 Without a showing of actual malice, punitive damages merely enhance
the problem of media self-censorship without any evidence of truly reprehensible
conduct.75
Justice White wrote a protracted dissent strongly criticizing the Court for
abandoning the long history of the common law standard for liability. 76 In White's
opinion the Court had no basis to overturn suddenly a standard of strict liability that
all fifty states had adopted, and that the Court had accepted for nearly two hundred
years. 77 He also condemned the abandonment of presumed and punitive damages in
those instances in which actual malice had not been proven, because the Court had
ignored the common law rationales for these doctrines. 78 The common law allowed
presumed and punitive damages because damages are too difficult to prove when
one's reputation has been unfairly besmirched. 79 Classically, punitive damages were
allowed only when "common law malice," ill will, had been shown. They were
indeed punishing reprehensible conduct, and therefore, Justice White contended,
there was no reason to require the additional showing of "actual malice." 80
67. Id. at 347.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 349-50.
70. Id. at 349.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 350.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 369-404 (white, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 370.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 394; see supra text accompanying notes 21-25.
80. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 396-97 (1974) (white, J., dissenting).
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D. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.
A major question that courts addressed after Gertz is whether the restrictions laid
down in Gertz would apply when the defendant was not the media, but a private
individual. 8 1
Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.82 presented the Court with a
perfect opportunity to decide whether the Gertz limitations would apply when the
media was not a party. In 1976, the defendant, a private credit reporting agency,
distributed to five of its customers a credit report stating that Greenmoss Builders,
Inc. had filed for bankruptcy. 83 Actually, a seventeen-year-old high school employee
of Dun & Bradstreet mistakenly had attributed a bankruptcy filing by a former
employee of Greenmoss to Greenmoss itself.84 Greenmoss had not filed for
bankruptcy at all. 85 Although it was the defendant's routine practice to check the
accuracy of its reports with the subject of the report, it never verified the bankruptcy
report with the plaintiff.8 6 When the plaintiff's president, John Flanagan, became
aware of the error, he notified defendant and a correction notice was issued.8 7
Flanagan was not satisfied with the correction, and repeatedly sought the names of the
subscribers that had received the false credit report. 88 When Dun & Bradstreet
refused to disclose its subscribers, plaintiff brought suit. 89
At the trial, the judge instructed the jury that the plaintiff did not need to prove
actual damages, for damages and loss were conclusively presumed since the
defamation was libelous per se. 90 The instruction also states that punitive damages
could only be found if the plaintiff could prove "actual malice," but no definition for
"actual malice" was given. 91 The jury delivered a verdict for the plaintiff awarding
$50,000 in compensatory damages and $300,000 in punitive damages. 92 The trial
court granted a motion for a new trial on the ground that the jury instructions
permitted the jurors to award presumed and punitive damages in violation of Gertz.93
The Vermont Supreme Court held that the trial court should not have granted a
new trial. 94 The Vermont court found no error in the jury instruction. 95 Drawing
support from the Oregon Supreme Court case, Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v.
81. See, e.g., Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 568 P.2d 1359 (Or. 1977); Calero v. Del Chem.
Corp., 68 Wis. 2d 487, 228 N.W.2d 737 (1975).
82. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
83. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 143 Vt. 66, 70-71, 461 A.2d 414, 416 (1983), aff'd on other
grounds, 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
84. Id. at 71, 461 A.2d at 416.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 70-72, 461 A.2d at 416.
89. Id. at 69, 461 A.2d at 415.
90. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 754 (1985).
91. Id.
92. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 143 Vt. 66, 69, 461 A.2d 414, 415 (1983), affd on other
grounds, 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
93. Id. at 69-70, 461 A.2d at 415.
94. Id. at 79, 461 A.2d at 421.
95. Id.
[Vol. 48:513
19871 DEFAMATION LAW: SULLIVAN THROUGH GREENMOSS 521
Markley,96 the court found that the first amendment policies leading the United States
Supreme Court to require limitations on the state's determination of its defamation
law are not present when the defendant is not a member of the media. 97 The Oregon
court had held, "There is no threat to the free and robust debate of public issues; there
is no potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas concerning self-
government; and there is no threat of liability causing a reaction of self-censorship by
the press," 98 when the defendant is not a member of the media.
The Vermont court realized the difficulty in drawing a clear line between what
is and what is not the media. But, in this instance, it found the defendant to be clearly
not part of the media. 99 The court found "a clear distinction between a publication
which disseminates news for public consumption and one which provides specialized
information to a selective, finite audience."' 10
The United States Supreme Court unanimously rejected the Vermont Supreme
Court's distinction based upon the media/nonmedia status of the defendant. 0 1 The
Court held that the press deserves no more protection than a private individual in
defamation actions.102
The plurality opinion, written by Justice Powell, the author of Gertz, affirmed
the holding of the Vermont Supreme Court that the requirement that the plaintiff show
actual malice before the state could allow presumed or punitive damages did not
apply in this case.103 The restrictions did not apply, not because Dun & Bradstreet
was not a member of the media, but because the issue concerned was a purely private
one.'14 Justice Powell resurrected the Rosenbloom public/private issue distinction that
he had rejected in Gertz as unworkable. However, in this case, the distinction would
not be a basis for establishing liability, but would be the basis for determining
whether to apply the standards which Gertz required a state to use when a private
figure was the plaintiff. 0 5
Justice Powell once again applied the balancing test that he had used in Gertz.1
06
By weighing the first amendment interest with the state's interest in compensating
private individuals for injury to their reputations, he found that when the issue is not
one of public concern, the first amendment interests at stake in Gertz are not as
strong. 107
96. 279 Or. 361, 568 P.2d 1359 (1977).
97. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 143 Vt. 66, 75, 461 A.2d 414, 418 (1983), aff'd on other
grounds, 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
98. Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc., v. Markley, 279 Or. 361, 370-71, 568 P.2d 1359, 1365 (1977).
99. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 143 Vt. 66, 73, 461 A.2d 414, 417 (1983), aff'd on other
grounds, 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
100. Id.
101. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 756, 764, 773.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 763.
104. Id. at 762.
105. Id. at 757-61.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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Justice Powell argued that the Court traditionally has recognized that not all
speech receives equal protection from the first amendment. 108 Speech concerning
"matters of public concern" is "at the heart of the first amendment's protection," 0 9
claimed Justice Powell. While the state's interests in awarding presumed and punitive
damages are not "substantial" compared to the first amendment interests in Gertz,
they become "substantial" compared to the speech with less first amendment value
present in the Greenmoss case. I t° Justice Powell emphasized the common law
reasons for establishing presumed damages that Justice White had pointed out in his
dissent in Gertz."'l
Justice Powell went on to decide that the credit report was a matter of purely
private concern." 2 The speech was "solely in the interest of the speaker and its
specific business audience."" 3 Weight was also given to the fact that the report was
distributed to only five people, and thus lacked any "strong interest in the free flow
of commercial information."14
Justice White concurred in the judgment of the Court. Reiterating his disagree-
ment with the Gertz opinion, he called for its reversal. 115 There was no valid reason
to discard the common law rules of defamation, Justice White again reasoned. " 6
However, this time he went further, calling for the reexamination of New York Times
itself. 117 He looked at the values that the New York Times Court was trying to
promote. 1 8 The Court was trying to prevent self-censorship on issues of public
importance.' 9 Since large jury verdicts, particularly large punitive damage judg-
ments, are what deter the media from pursuing controversial subjects, Justice White
contended that the size of the verdict should be the target of constitutional
limitations. 120
Justice White emphasized that the purpose of common law defamation actions
was as much to clear one's name as to receive monetary compensation. '2' False
speech has no positive constitutional value, wrote White, and, to the contrary,
erroneous information frustrates uninhibited, robust, and "wide-open debate" on
public issues.122 Under the New York Times holding, White contended, a public
official who is the subject of a defamatory falsehood, but cannot prove actual malice,
108. Id. at 758 n.5. Justice Powell pointed out that obscene speech and fighting words have received no first
amendment protection, id. (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957), and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)), and that commercial speech occupies a "subordinate position in the scale of First
Amendment values." Id. (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)).
109. Id. (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940)).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 757 n.4. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
112. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 763.
115. Id. at 767 (White, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 772.
117. Id. at 767.
118, Id.
119. Id. at 770.
120. Id. at 774.
121. Id. at 771.
122. Id. at 767.
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is unable to vindicate his or her reputation, and a false fact is allowed to remain
unexposed to the public.123 Justice White argued that if the Court would abandon the
heightened burden on the plaintiff and simply limit the amount of the damages, the
public official could vindicate his or her name, a false fact would be exposed, and
there would be no unreasonable verdict that might lead to self-censorship by the
press. 124
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Brennan and supported by Justices
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, disagreed with Justice Powell's interpretation of
the Gertz case.t 2 5 The dissent pointed out that in Gertz, Justice Powell had not found
that the interest the state had in presumed and punitive damages was outweighed by
first amendment concerns, but that presumed damages were overbroad and the
damages were, in Justice Powell's words, "wholly irrelevant" to the state's
interest. 126 The dissent would have applied Gertz to all defamation cases. 1 7
E. The Current Framework
It is not clear how much Greenmoss will change the framework that the courts
currently apply. The plurality in Greenmoss rejected the media/nonmedia status of the
defendant as a basis for deciding the proper level of liability, but the criteria the
plurality used to determine whether an issue is a private or public one seem to lead
to the same result. Justice Powell discussed the level of public interest and the scope
of dissemination as factors in determining whether the issue is public or private. Upon
closer examination, it becomes clear that these are also the factors which would
determine whether the communicator is part of the media. If the issue was not of any
interest to the public, it would not be of interest to the media.1 28 If the scope of the
communication was small, the communicator was probably not a member of the
media. While the Court has avoided having liability rest on whether the label
"media" has been stamped on the defendant, the rationale that lower courts have
used in determining whether the defendant is a member of the media need not change
when those courts apply the Court's public/private concern test.
The major question that the Court left open in Greenmoss was whether a plaintiff
need even prove negligence on the part of the defendant where the issue is a private
one. 129 The Court only addressed the question of whether the restrictions on punitive
123. Id. at 769-71.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 775 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 779 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1973)).
127. Id. at 77940.
128. A media publisher, acting in its own self-interest, will publish only the information in which it feels the public
is interested. While it can be argued that there is a difference between facts that the public "is concerned with" and those
facts which are in the "public concern," it would be extremely troublesome for the courts to second guess publishers as
to what facts were actually in the "public concern."
129. The plurality opinion did not address the question of whether the negligence requirement established in Gertz
would apply when a private issue was concerned, probably the Greenmoss defendant clearly had been negligent. Justice
White read the plurality opinion to mean that negligence would not have to be shown when a private issue was concerned.
Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 770 (1985) (White, J., concurring). The dissenters
interpreted the plurality opinion differently, and argue that a plaintiff still must prove negligence to sustain a defamation
claim. Id. at 775-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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and presumed damages found in the Gertz opinion applied in the case of a private
issue, and did not discuss the question of the standard of liability required for
judgment. Although the plurality opinion did not address the question, the language
in the Greenmoss opinion seems to indicate that Gertz does not apply at all where a
purely private issue is concerned. 1 30 The question of where the balance would fall
between the state's interest in prescribing strict liability in defamation cases and the
interests of the first amendment is left unanswered.
While the Greenmoss decision revives the common law of defamation where the
issue is of no public concern, at least on the issue of damages, the framework for
constitutional libel established in New York Times remains substantially the same.
Currently, if the plaintiff is a public figure, he or she must show actual malice,
defined as knowledge of falsity or acting with reckless disregard for the truth, to
sustain a judgment in his or her favor. 131 If the plaintiff is a private figure, he or she
need not show actual malice to win on the liability issue. 132 When the issue is a public
matter, the plaintiff must at least show negligence and is precluded from presumed
and punitive damages unless he or she can also show actual malice. 133 When the issue
is a private matter, the plaintiff need not show actual malice to obtain presumed and
punitive damages, and it is not clear whether he or she need even show negligence
to establish liability and receive the presumed damages. 134 It is this basic framework
which forms the basis for the problems that exist with the constitutional restrictions
on state defamation law.
IV. A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
A. The Problems with the Present Framework
The goal of a constitutional policy should be to balance the interests of the first
amendment with those of the state in protecting its citizens from defamatory
falsehoods.135 The means chosen should provide for redress of the injuries incurred
by the plaintiff and punishment of the publisher who acts outrageously without
deterring the publisher from printing legitimate statements. The current constitutional
means do not adequately accomplish any of these objectives. While juries are willing
to award verdicts to injured plaintiffs, appellate courts nearly always overturned these
verdicts. '3 6 Those verdicts that do survive are usually extremely large and may be so
devastating to a publisher, especially a small one, that it would be forced to avoid
130. See supra text accompanying notes 106-10.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 32-57.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 58-80.
133. Id.
134. See supra note 129.
135. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974).
136. A 1981 study revealed that juries find against media defendants 85% of the time. Trial courts strike down 20%
of these verdicts, and appellate courts reverse 66% of the remaining verdicts. On the whole, the plaintiff has only a 7%
chance of success. Franklin, Suing the Media for Libel: A Litigation Study, 1981 A1. B. FoUND. REs. J. 795, 803 (1981);
Franklin, A Critique of Libel Law, 18 U.S.F.L. REv. 1, 5, n.23 (1983) [hereinafter cited as A Critique].
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reporting on controversial areas, 37 or even forced to cease publication. t38 Many
commentators and some of the justices have attacked the New York Times framework
as being too complex to apply fairly and as being inadequate to protect either
plaintiffs or defendants. 139
B. Should the Defamation Claim Be Abolished?
One suggested solution, expressed frequently by Justices Black and Douglas, 40
is to eliminate defamation as a cause of action altogether. They argued that the
defamation claim is inherently inconsistent with the first amendment. 141 While this
standard would certainly eliminate the confusion that currently exists, it would
neither protect individuals nor actually promote first amendment policies.
The interest a state has in protecting the individual from unfair attacks should not
be dismissed. The individual's right to the protection of his or her own good name
"reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every
human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty." 142 The
effects of a defamatory attack can be devastating upon a person's economic and
personal life. 143
Eliminating defamation as a cause of action would also not further the interests
of the first amendment. 44 While the negative first amendment interest, prevention of
the "chilling effect" would certainly be satisfied, the positive interests of the first
amendment would be controverted. Even one of the original advocates of our modem
conception of free speech, John Stuart Mill, recognized the fundamental difference
137. Anderson, supra note 2, at 422; Franklin, A Critique, supra note 136, at 16-18; Hunter, A Reprise on Herbert
v. Lando and the Law ofDefamation, 71 Ky. L.J. 569, 591 (1982-83); Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation
of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. Rv. 1, 12 (1983); Note, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages in Libel
Actions, 45 FORD. L. REv. 1382, 1424 (1977); The Little Guy in the Big Suit, Cot.i. J. REv., Jan.-Feb. 1983, at 42;
Kupferberg, Libel Fever, CoLi. J. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1981, at 36, 39; Friendly, Investigative Journalism is Changing
Some of lts Goals and Softening Tone, N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1983, at 8, col. 1. Contra Smith, The Rising Tide of Libel
Litigation: Implications of the Gertz Negligence Rules, 44 Morr. L. REV. 71, 87 (1983) (counsel for the Washington Post
indicating that libel litigation had not changed the paper's policies).
138. One particularly dramatic example of this danger can be seen in the libel litigation against the Alton Telegraph,
when a daily paper from Alton, Illinois with a circulation of 38,000 was subject to a $9.2 million judgment. Green v.
Alton Telegraph Co., 77-66 (Madison County, 111. 1980). The newspaper was forced to file for bankruptcy, but a
settlement was eventually reached that allowed it to stay in business. [News Notes], Media L. Rep. (BNA) (June 8, 1982).
For an interesting discussion of how the suit has affected the paper, see Wall St. J. Sept. 29, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
139. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763-67 (1985) (Burger, C.J. & White, J.
concurring); Franklin, A Critique, supra note 136, at 29-34; Smolla, supra note 137, at 48, 63-64.
140. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 356 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
403 U.S. 29, 57 (1971) (Black, J., concurring); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 297 (1964) (Black, J.,
concurring).
141. See infra note 143.
142. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
143. See L. ELDRrXE, supra note 2, at 11 ("One who believes that he appears to be ridiculous in the eyes of his
fellow men can suffer an agony of emotional distress which may be more painful, and far more lasting, than the pain from
the severed nerves of a tom-off arm.").
144. Justice Stewart also identified other general public values that would be harmed if the defamation cause of
action was eliminated:
The preventive effect of liability for defamation serves an important public purpose. For the rights and values
of private personality far transcend mere personal interests. Surely if the 1950s taught us anything, they taught
us that the poisonous atmosphere of the easy lie can infect and degrade a whole society.
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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between false ideas and false facts. 145 "False" ideas have positive value in that they
reaffirm the strength of a true idea. 146 The weeding out of "false" ideas should be
a function of the marketplace of ideas. 147 On the other hand, accurate factual
information is a requirement if the marketplace of ideas is to function correctly. As
in the economic free market, one of the necessary assumptions in free market theory
is perfect information flow to the consumer. 148 False facts cannot be dealt with in the
marketplace, and, to the contrary, impair people's ability to make a knowledgeable
decision.
By providing no cause of action for the publication of false and defamatory
statements, the market place of ideas is harmed in three ways. First, there would be
no means of correcting any falsehood put into the market. Although the injured party
can use more speech to combat the false fact, the common law of defamation is
predicated on the fact that self-help through more speech is not sufficient to expose
false facts. 149 One function of the defamation action is to inform the public that a
statement made was false.
Second, publishers will have much less incentive to determine the truthfulness
of what they print. The scrupulous publisher may, for economic reasons, spend less
time insuring the truthfulness of each statement.15 0 While maintaining a good
reputation for accuracy still provides a strong incentive to insure the accuracy of each
statement printed, on the whole that incentive would still be reduced. 151 The
unscrupulous publisher, for whom reputation for accuracy does not matter, would be
set free to libel at will.
Third, the public will have less faith in the press in general, even the members
of the press who print the truth, because the public knows that no legal action can be
taken against a publisher who prints known lies. 152
C. Proposals for Reform
Many commentators have put forth proposals for a more effective defamation
law.
1. Regulating the Type of Damages
One type of reform centers around the kind of harm which would need to be
proved, and the form of damages which serve to compensate for that harm. Professor
Anderson has proposed that presumed damages be totally abolished and that the
145. Mill, Law of Libel and Liberty of the Press, in JOHN STUART MILL ON Powmcs AND Socisry 143-60 (G. Williams
ed. 1976).
146. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 584 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting); J. MuL., ON LmERTY 17-19 (R.
McCallum ed. 1859).
147. Id.
148. T. ScrrovsKy, WELFARE AND COMPETITION 345 (1951).
149. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 46 (1971).
150. For a discussion on how the threat of damages stemming from a libel suit affects the economic behavior of a
publisher, see R. Postal, AN Ecoxo.uc ANALYsis oF LAW 544 (1977).
151. Franklin, A Critique, supra note 136, at 27-28.
152. Hunsaker, Freedom and Responsibility in First Amendment Theory: Defamation, Law, and Media Credibility,
65 Q.J. OF SPErrc 25 (1979).
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"actual injury" harm of Gertz be further restricted. 1 53 Presumed damages, according
to Anderson, give no guidance at all to the jury as to how to compensate the
plaintiff. 154 The jury is likely to use impermissible factors, such as the defendant's
wealth or unpopularity, in determining the damage award. 155 The judge also has no
real grounds to reduce a jury's verdict. Only a "flagrantly outrageous and
extravagant" award can be reduced. 15
6
Anderson contends that Gertz's requirement of proof of "actual injury" is too
broad. 157 The purpose of the defamation claim, argues Anderson, is to redress
reputational harm. 58 Courts, nonetheless, have allowed damages for non-
reputational injuries, such as emotional distress, in defamation suits. 159 Allowing
compensation for this type of harm, he argues, has resulted in gratuitous awards to
plaintiffs who have suffered no reputational damage whatsoever. 160 Anderson would
allow damages for emotional harm only where some reputational harm had been
proved. 161
Anderson claims that by restricting compensatory damages to those actually
proved, and by subordinating non-reputational harm, more accurate determinations of
harm will be made, the judge will have more control over the size of the verdict, and
both parties will be able to accurately judge the value of their claims which facilitates
settlement. 162
A closer look at Anderson's proposals raises questions about their effectiveness
and fairness to plaintiffs. Eliminating non-reputational harm as a primary harm in the
defamation claim is not an effective means of reducing damage awards. Emotional
harm is an injury, and if removed from the defamation claim, a related cause of action
based primarily on emotional harm, such as false-light privacy, 163 will be added to
the complaint.' 64 This related tort raises the same first amendment concerns as the
defamation tort, and is treated in the same New York Times framework. 165
The common law developed the concept of presumed damages to deal with the
unique nature of reputational harm. 166 Anderson's notion that reputational harm is
easily subject to testimonial proof seems questionable. He presents the unlikely
scenario that a plaintiff's associates would testify that the seeds of doubt had been
implanted in their minds, even though they did not believe the defamatory
153. Anderson, supra note 2, at 756.
154. Id. at 749.
155. Id. at 750.
156. Id. at 752 (quoting Chancellor Kent in Coleman v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 44, 52 (N.Y. 1812)).
157. Id. at 756.
158. Id. at 758.
159. See Time Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 460 (1976).
160. Anderson, supra note 2, at 757-58; see Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone: A Study in Constitutional
Policy-Making, 61 MiNra. L. REv. 645, 670-71 (1977).
161. Anderson, supra note 2, at 757-58 (treating emotional distress as parasitic as in other tort actions).
162. Id. at 775-76.
163. See RmsTATEiENT (SEco.ND) OF TORTS § 652A(2)(d).
164. See Van Alstyne, First Amendment Limitations on Recovery From the Press -An Extended Comment on "The
Anderson Solution,'" 25 W i. & MARY L. REv. 793, 809-11 (1984).
165. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 21-24.
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statements.1 67 The common law recognized that such harm is very subtle, possibly
residing in a person's subconscious, and therefore proof of that harm was not
available through customary means.168
2. Splitting the Cause of Action
Other commentators have proposed a new cause of action emphasizing the
vindicatory function of a defamation claim. 169 Professor Franklin has proposed that
there be two separate remedies for a defamatory attack. 170 A damage action could be
brought where the plaintiff, whether a public or private figure, would need to show
actual malice before recovering any damages. 171 The plaintiff would also have the
option of bringing a "restoration" action, which allows awarding of a declaratory
judgment of falsehood and recovery of reasonable attorney's fees.' 72
Professor Ingber has proposed three separate remedies. 173 The first is a strict
liability action where the only remedy is a declaratory judgment and damages for
actual pecuniary loss.174 The second is a negligence standard claim, where upon a
showing that the defendant acted negligently, the plaintiff could obtain the same
remedies available in the strict liability action, plus reasonable attorney's fees.175 The
third action would require a showing of actual malice, and damages for actual injury
could be recovered. 176
There are two main problems with these types of proposals. First, the damage
action will remain a complicated and expensive ordeal because actual malice would
need to be proved. Second, to avoid the legal expense of bringing a damage action,
the plaintiff must choose a remedy which, while performing the vindicatory function,
leaves the plaintiff uncompensated for a major portion of the injury.
3. Mitigation of Harm
Another commentator has proposed a solution based on mitigation principles.
Professor LeBel has proposed a "right of repair" which would allow the defendant
to eliminate all presumed damages by devoting the same amount of resources used to
publish the defamation to counter the false statements. 17 7 Damages would still be
available for actual injury which has been proved.17 8
167. Anderson, supra note 2, at 767.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 21-24.
169. See Franklin, A Critique, supra note 136, at 35-49; Ingber, A Conflict Between Reason and Decency, 65 VA.
L. REv. 785, 852-57 (1979).
170. Franklin, A Critique, supra note 136, at 36.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Ingber, supra note 169, at 852-57.
174. Id. at 852-55.
175. Id. at 855-56.
176. Id. at 856-57.
177. LeBel, Defamation and the First Amendment: The End of the Affair, 25 WM. & Mav L. REv. 779, 788-89
(1984).
178. Id. at 789 n.42.
[Vol. 48:513
1987] DEFAMATION LAW: SULLIVAN THROUGH GREENMOSS 529
While this proposal recognizes that a retraction can mitigate damages, the
mitigation value of the right of repair appears arbitrary. On one side, there is no
correlation between the presumed harm and the amount spent to publish the
defamatory statement. A short, careless falsehood can cause much more damage than
a long, complicated, and more expensive falsehood. The first falsehood could go
undercompensated, while the second falsehood could be overcompensated. On the
other side, the mitigatory value of a retraction is underutilized if it only goes to
mitigate presumed damages. A significant retraction could reduce the proven harm as
well.
D. A Proposal for a New Framework
This Note proposes a new framework for achieving an effective balance between
the first amendment and the state's interest in its defamation law. The proposal calls
for a return to the common law strict liability standard with the burden of proving
falsity by clear and convincing evidence on the plaintiff, and with restrictions placed
on the damage portion of the verdict. Recognizing the strong rationale behind the
common law doctrine of presumed damages, this proposal would not restrict damage
awards by eliminating the presumption of harm. Instead, mitigation principles would
be used to reduce jury awards. Two damage awards would be given by the jury. One
damage award would assess the dollar amount of the injury suffered by the plaintiff,
the normal damage verdict, and a second verdict would state what the dollar value of
the injury to the plaintiff would be after being mitigated by a significant retraction by
the defendant. The defendant would then have the choice of paying out the whole
dollar value of the injury, or making the significant retraction and paying the surplus
damage. Finally, judges, both appellate and trial, must take a more active role in
reducing unreasonable jury verdicts.
The strict liability standard addresses the interests of the injured plaintiff much
better than the current standard. 179 The vindicatory aspect of the defamation suit
would regain its proper position. 80 A plaintiff would still retain a heavy burden of
proving falsity, but once falsity is proved, a verdict should be rendered in favor of the
plaintiff, achieving at least part of the plaintiff's goals in bringing the suit.
The strict liability standard also furthers first amendment interests. The issue of
liability is not what causes the "chilling effect" upon a publisher.' 8' Publishers
probably will not avoid controversial issues, solely on the possibility that they would
be forced to admit their mistake if a statement was proven false. The common law
rules of privilege would also work to prevent any self-censorship.182
179. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 765 (1985) (White, J., concurring); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 370-80 (1974).
180. See. e.g., Franklin, A Critique, supra note 136, at 40-46 (discussing the importance of vindication in his
proposal for a new claim of "restoration"); Hulme, Vindicating Reputation: An Alternative to Damages as a Remedy for
Defamation, 30 Am!. U.L. REv. 375, 391-414 (1981) (proposing pure vindication as a remedy); Note, An Alternative to
the General-Damage Award for Defamation, 20 STAN. L. Ray. 504, 505 (1968) (proposing a retraction statute).
181. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340-41 (1974).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 25-31.
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With strict liability, false facts would be exposed to the public after they were
proved false. Under the current system, when the issue is a public one and the interest
of the public in exposing false facts is at its highest, a false fact will remain
unexposed unless the plaintiff shows not only that the fact was false, but that the
publisher acted either negligently or recklessly, depending on whether the plaintiff
was a public or private figure. 183 These latter concerns are irrelevant to whether the
public should be allowed to perceive the false fact as true. Thus, many false facts are
allowed to remain unexposed simply because the plaintiff could not prove that the
defendant acted with the requisite mental element. 184
Strict liability will also drastically reduce the time and cost of defamation
litigation, items which lead directly to a "chilling effect."' 185 The only factual issues
at the trial would be the falsity of the statement and the damage suffered by the
plaintiff.186 The extensive discovery process into the method of editorial operation of
the defendant would no longer be necessary. 187
The cause of the "chilling effect" that the New York Times Court was trying to
prevent is a result, not of the issue of liability, but of the damage award. 188 It is the
spectre of a large dollar payoff which deters a publisher from pursuing a controversial
story. 189 A damage award must try to fairly compensate the victim without chilling
legitimate speech.
Under this Note's proposal, a jury would determine the dollar value of the harm
suffered by the plaintiff as in any civil suit, but then the publisher would be given a
further chance to mitigate the harm by publishing a significant retraction. The judge
could give the jury instructions on what a significant retraction would entail, giving
consideration to the prominence and scope of the original defamatory statement.190
To avoid any possible first amendment problem in forcing a paper to print a
retraction,191 the publisher would have a choice of paying the full award, or printing
the retraction and paying the remaining damage if there is any.
This type of damage structure would provide incentive for publishers to settle
with plaintiffs earlier in the litigation process.' 92 The longer the time period from the
183. See supra text accompanying notes 58-80.
184. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 755-56 (1985).
185. See Franklin, A Critique, supra note 136, at 13-14; Smolla, supra note 137, at 13-14; Jenkins, Chilly Days
for the Press, Ssotnsr LAW., Apr. 1983, at 23, 25.
186. There remains the vexing problem of punitive damages. The time and cost saving elements of this Note's
proposal may not be present if an "actual malice" standard is required in order to gain punitive damages. A fuller
discussion of this area is beyond the scope of this Note.
187. Currently, a plaintiff can, during discovery, delve into the internal editorial process of the publisher to help
determine the standard of care the defendant used. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160-77 (1978).
188. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340-41 (1983).
189. See supra text accompanying note 138.
190. State retraction statutes would also provide an aid in determining the required form for a significant retraction.
See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CooE § 48a (West 1954); FLA. STAT. Am. §§ 770.02, 836.08 (Vest 1979); Outo R-v. CODE A . §
2739.13 (Anderson 1981); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 30.160, .165, .170 (1979). See generally, Morris, Inadvertant Newspaper
Libel and Retraction, 32 ILL. L. Rav. 36, 41-44 (1937). See also, Note, infra note 180, at 530-37 (proposing a retraction
statute).
191. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (first amendment prevents state from requiring
newspapers to print a reply for Fairness Doctrine reasons).
192. See Franklin, A Critique, supra note 136, at 45.
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original publication to the retraction, the greater the surplus damages will be, because
a retraction is much less effective in reducing the harm to the plaintiff when a long
time has passed since the original defamatory publication. 193
The heavy burden on the plaintiff on the issue of falsity and the ability of the
appellate courts to re-examine the facts on an independent basis would prevent a jury
from punishing a defendant merely for publishing unpopular views.' 94 This heavy
burden will also reduce the chance that a publisher would feel pressured to retract a
statement he or she believes to be true in fear of a large damage verdict.
Under the current standard, liability itself is equated with a possible violation of
first amendment interests. 195 Because the Court recognized that juries may be
punishing unpopular content or simply misapplying the confusing constitutional
standard of actual malice, appellate courts have been given the power to indepen-
dently review the facts of the case to determine whether there was sufficient evidence
for the jury's verdict rather than following the "clearly erroneous" standard. 196 Since
it is the size of the verdict that actually raises a possible conflict with first amendment
interests, courts should take a more active role in reducing oversized damage awards.
Appellate courts could be given a similar power to independently review the facts to
determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support the damage award. 197 The
importance of the constitutional right, and the inherent tendency of juries to violate
the right justify granting this extraordinary power to the judges.
Deciding the validity of a damage award, however, raises particular problems in
a defamation action. Because presumed damages are allowed, there is no clear
standard available to determine the validity of the verdict. There are, however, some
guidelines which would enable the courts to assess the harm which the plaintiff has
actually suffered. The scope of reception of the defamation, how defamatory the
statement actually was, the previous reputation of the defendant, and the type of
reputational harm the plaintiff suffered all provide the courts with standards for
accepting or reducing a damage award. t98
193. See W. PRossER & W. KEEro, ToRts 845-46 (5th ed. 1984); cf., e.g., Linney v. Maton, 13 Tex. 449, 458
(1855) (retraction made immediately after a defamatory comment can totally mitigate the harm).
194. See Franklin & Bussel, The Plaintiff's Burden in Defamation: Awareness and Falsity, 25 \vs. & MARY L. REV.
825, 864-65 (1984).
195. See supra text accompanying notes 32-80.
196. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 509-10 (1984); New York Times
v. Sullivan 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment", 1964 Sup. Cr. REv. 191, 220.
The Bose case held that the clearly erroneous standard of FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous. ... ) does not prescribe the scope of appellate review of a finding of actual malice in
a defamation case. The Court held that the first amendment concerns of the defamation area required appellate courts to
use independent fact review on the constitutional issue, because the jury's application "is unlikely to be neutral with
respect to the content of speech and holds a real danger of becoming an instrument for the suppression of those vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks, which must be protected if the guarantees of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments are to prevail." Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510 (1984).
197. Cf. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 CoLws. L. REv. 229, 245 (1985) (raising the possibility that
courts could apply the Bose rationale to reduce jury verdicts at the appellate level).
198. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 765-66 (1984).
Professor Anderson listed four types of reputational harm: (1) Harm to existing relations; (2) Interference with future
relations; (3) Harm to a present favorable public image; and (4) Creating a negative public image for a person who
previously had no reputation at all. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
The plurality decision in Greenmoss restores the common law of defamation
where the defamatory statement concerns a private issue, at least as far as presumed
and punitive damages are concerned, and possibly even on the issue of liability.
However, this step is not enough. Unless the whole New York Times framework is
overturned, the problems that have plagued the defamation area will continue. The
uncertainty of application, and the inherent nature of a cause of action which requires
proof of the mental state of the defendant, will continue to raise the legal costs of both
bringing and defending a defamation action to unacceptable levels. These costs,
along with the possibility of a huge jury verdict, will bring on the "chilling effect"
that the New York Times standard is supposed to prevent. Plaintiffs who suffer harm
will be unable to be compensated in any way, including public vindication, and false
facts will remain unexposed to the public except in those limited situations where the
plaintiff can prove actual malice.
The standards proposed in this Note would limit the negative first amendment
interest of the chilling effect by strictly scrutinizing damage awards and encouraging
mitigation by retraction. Positive first amendment interests would be promoted by
exposing false facts more readily than the current framework. Plaintiffs would have
the ability to at least publicly vindicate their names, and possibly receive some
monetary compensation if a retraction would not be sufficient. Thus, these proposals
would protect both the important interests of the individual citizen's reputation and
the encouragement of an aggressive press.
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